Elections Canada on Internet voting

Chief Electoral Officer Marc Mayrand recently published his report on the 41st General Election, held earlier this year. It includes one reference to Internet voting:

Elections Canada has been examining Internet voting as a complementary and convenient way to cast a ballot. The Chief Electoral Officer is committed to seeking approval for a test of Internet voting in a by-election held after 2013.

The CBC headlined their article on the report with it: Elections Canada lobbies for test of online voting. Clearly the topic has gone mainstream. Overall, I see reasons for optimism: first, note that the press is making the distinction between electronic voting and online voting; an old lament of mine. Second, they've highlighted the proper implementation of the secret ballot as one of the concerns about voting online. And, finally, Elections Canada isn't racing ahead on this -- note that the statement I quoted doesn't include a deadline. They are also eliciting informed opinions, and remaining far more technology agnostic than most folks would expect them to be, I would imagine:

Strategic initiatives
Our key strategies to support [the Accessibility] objective in the next five years are to:
... with the prior approval of Parliament, test a secure voting process during a by-election that allows electors to vote by telephone or Internet

Strategic Plan 2008-2013 (the emphasis is mine)

It isn't perfect, of course: that workshop made but one reference to the risk of coerced voting, as far as I could tell. Also, the public discourse -- well, such as it is in comments on press articles, and the questions raised at that workshop -- hasn't adequately quashed that old argument celebrating online banking (and tax filing, I've seen recently) as proof that the nut of Internet security has been cracked. As I've stated previously, that argument is based on a false premise. Still, I'm hopeful that these trials to come will be well run, their results thoroughly examined, before any Internet facilitated process débuts in an election on our national stage.

21st century vote

Michael Geist linked to a Sun story about Alberta considering on-line/Internet voting for the province at some point in the future, using the term e-voting in the title of the post. This muddying of terms really worries me; it has huge implications for this issue, I maintain: while e-voting machines may one day be a viable option for elections in Canada, I have serious doubts about the same ever being true of on-line/Internet voting.

This quote from Alberta's Chief Electoral Officer highlights a few of my concerns:

I can do my banking online, but I can’t do my voting online... Once it has been proven to be effective, that the votes can be certified, all that security stuff can be looked after, I certainly see that as something that’s coming. Anything that we can do to make the process more accessible to electors is obviously a good thing.

First, the security requirements associated with on-line banking differ significantly from those associated with any Internet voting system. I would also suggest that they are much more complex: consider that, under the current system, a voter cannot be directly linked with his or her specific vote and is therefore free from being coerced to vote a certain way. Similarly, banks accept a certain level of fraud (including on-line fraud) as the price of doing business; I don't think the same can be said of any voting system we would consider using to determine the leadership of the country.

This brings me to my second point: there are complexities in this that shouldn't be passed on to other trials, be they in the EU, the US, or wherever. When officials in power use phrases like "security stuff" and imply that other smart people are doing things, so why aren't we, well, again, I get nervous. He uses the term certified. What does that mean to him, or the people conducting the trial? Again, if part of it includes proving that a particular user cast a particular vote -- certainly part of a plausible definition -- that would obviously have enormous privacy implications (as it is completely unnecessary, and just asking for problems, however careful the government is with that information).

Finally, in addition to confusing e-voting machines with Internet voting -- I'm sure someone in power thinks trials of one have some bearing on the suitability of the other -- voter turn-out, or the lack thereof in recent years, always seems to come up in these discussions. And while I'll be the first to admit that it's an important issue, it's for that very reason that it should be divorced from any discussion about the voting systems to be used. Otherwise, the implication is that advent of one-click Internet voting will bring the young voters in droves. On this point, I like the provincial NDP leader's comment (i.e., look at mandatory voting, as they have in Australia); while one could question the merit of the suggestion, the idea that voter engagement need not be synonymous with Internet voting is spot on.

Update: Geist on why thoughts of using Internet voting in provincial and federal elections are premature.

The fact that high on the list of reasons (if not the #1 reason) for not offering on-line voting to Ottawa voters is inaccurate voter lists does not reassure me in the least. Presumably, we'd all be receiving plain white envelopes marked Important Municipal Election Information if they could iron out that little wrinkle.

Out of curiousity, a friend of mine (one of the voters in this apparent field test of Prescott Russell, and Stormont Dundas and Glengarry) held his envelope in front of a common light bulb, easily reading his six-digit identification number and his four-digit authentication number (CanVote calls it a PIN).

This is truly scary. I thought these discussions (let alone implementations) were years off.